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implement such a recommendation.
While a draft policy was drawn up in
2001, it has yet to be promulgated,
pending the formation of greater insti-
tutional links among various Indian
ministries with responsibilities in this
area. The Ministry of Defense was
tasked to initiate such an
interministerial coordinating body, but
so far the policy has not been formal-
ized. Even without such a public policy,
India is moving ahead with enhancing
its maritime security in all its spheres.
ANDREW C. WINNER
Naval War College
Smith, Edward A., Jr. Effects Based Operations:
Applying Network-centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis,
and War. Washington, D.C.: Department of De-
fense Command and Control Research Program,
2002. 545pp. $20
“Effects-based operations [EBO] are co-
ordinated sets of actions directed at
shaping the behavior of friends, foes,
and neutrals in peace, crisis, and war.”
This definition is offered in Edward
Smith’s long, tortuous study, Effects
Based Operations. Substitute the terms
“speeches by the president,” “negotia-
tions by diplomats,” or “economic
sanctions” for “effects-based opera-
tions,” and the emptiness of this defini-
tion becomes all too evident.
The major difficulty with this work,
however, lies in the following passage:
“The very nature of military competi-
tion should make it clear that would-be
foes will attempt to exploit any warfare
niche in which they believe the United
States and its allies cannot successfully
engage. Logically, these would-be foes
will see exploitable niches wherever
network-centric and effects-based oper-
ations are least applicable. Urban and
guerrilla warfare, counter-terrorism op-
erations, peacekeeping efforts, and hos-
tage rescues are just a few examples.”
With this statement, Smith has gratu-
itously undermined the importance and
value of effects-based operations (drag-
ging network-centric operations along
in the process), for those “niches” con-
stitute the shortlist of operations U.S.
military forces will be undertaking for
the foreseeable future.
This is a complex and ambitious book,
which progresses from a general dis-
cussion of EBO through chapters that
illustrate the relationship with network-
centric operations, discuss operations
in the cognitive domain, and describe
how complexity factors into the pic-
ture. Toward the end of the book an
operational example is offered before
some general conclusions are reached.
Effects-based operations, we are repeat-
edly reminded, focus on the mind of
man. The “effects-based strategy is con-
ceived and executed as a direct assault
on the opponent’s will and not a by-
product of destroying his capability to
wage war.” Just what the “opponent’s
will” constitutes is not clearly ad-
dressed. Is it the will of the soldiers in
the field, the will of the civilians sup-
porting the effort, or the will of the
leadership? The differences in Opera-
tion IRAQI FREEDOM are noteworthy.
The will of the Iraqi armed forces was
quickly broken, as they threw down
their arms and fled. But was the will of
Saddam, of the brothers Hussein, or of
the Iraqi resistance broken? How can
one confidently determine a change in
will, and how can one be totally sure
that the change is permanent? No
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theory is offered to help the reader un-
derstand how to break the will of
fanatics.
In a long, intricate work there are
bound to be contradictions, but when
they cut to the core of the argument,
they become disconcerting. For exam-
ple, one reads: “In effects-based opera-
tions, therefore, actions and their
effects are not and cannot be isolated.
They are interrelated.” But later the au-
thor writes, “If those disproportionate
effects are to shape behavior in the di-
rection we want, however, we must fig-
ure out first how to trace the path of an
action to a certain effect, and then how
to plan the right actions to set the chain
in motion.”
None of this means that effects-based
operations should not be pursued—
only that Smith does not have it quite
right. Better, one should think carefully
about EBO in terms of objectives. Rear
Admiral Henry Eccles provided in these
pages over twenty years ago the key in-
sight in this regard: “The objectives rep-
resent ‘the effect desired,’ what one is
seeking to achieve by the use of military
force.” Eccles guides one to the recogni-
tion that the selection of objectives pro-
vides the desired effect—hence the basis
for effects-based warfare. Of course,
one can select objectives for which the
effects either are monumentally diffi-
cult to achieve or can never be clearly
determined. To change the will of, say,
Osama Bin Laden falls squarely in this
latter category.
Unfortunately, the publisher of this
book did not do Smith or his readers any
favor by printing the text in a sans-serif
font in a fully justified format. There is
a reason why books and newspapers use
serif fonts—“kerning” of letters and
words makes them significantly easier
to read in small type sizes. The book
also lacks an index, which makes find-
ing items quite a feat, and the footnotes
do not correlate with the text.
Effects Based Operations is presented in
the first person plural. Employment of
the first person plural has two serious
drawbacks—consistency and advocacy.
On some pages “we” takes on at least
three separate meanings—U.S. decision
makers, the author himself, and the au-
thor and his reader. In other places
“we” appears to refer to the U.S. Navy,
and elsewhere to U.S. military forces.
This proves rather confusing for the
reader, who is continually challenged to
discern to whom the author is referring.
Use of the first person, moreover, gives
this book the tang of an in-house, parti-
san staff study rather than a dispassion-
ate analysis.
Finally, the bibliography is thin, omit-
ting such important works as General
David Deptula’s Effects-Based Opera-
tions: Change in the Nature of Warfare
(Aerospace Education Foundation,
2001) and Paul Davis’s Effects-Based
Operations (EBO): A Grand Challenge
for the Analytical Community (RAND,
2001).
All in all, this book was a disappoint-
ment, weighed down by its length, its
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